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ABSTRACT 
Both before and after 1974, the question of territory controlled by 
the Greek or the Turkish side in Cyprus has been one of the most 
important and enduring aspects of the Cyprus problem. With its 
starting point at an unpublished telegram (from the National 
Archives of Australia) detailing secret UK views, this paper 
examines British -and to a slightly lesser extent, US- policy towards 
Cyprus in July and August 1974. In particular it focuses on policy 
towards the amount of territory that could, would or should be 
controlled by Turkey in Cyprus; on the factors that led to this policy 
and its eventual implementation by Turkey; on the changes of stance 
and the interaction between British and US policy (and James 
Callaghan and Henry Kissinger respectively); on military 
assessments and options in Cyprus; and on the reasons 
why ultimately the British policy in Cyprus failed in August 1974.  
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From Pragmatism to Idealism to Failure:  
Britain in the Cyprus crisis of 1974 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
After a long crisis involving Archbishop Makarios, at the time President of the 
Republic of Cyprus and the Greek military junta, on 15 July 1974, the latter 
launched a coup that successfully deposed the former. With the delicate 
balance on the island of Cyprus upset, Turkey, initially using as a pretext the 
restoration of the constitutional order of the island (and later, increasingly, the 
protection of the Turkish-Cypriot minority), in a two stage operation (20-30 
July and 14-16 August 1974), invaded and occupied initially around 5% and 
eventually close to 36% of Cyprus. Contrary to their previous (1964 and 1967) 
record, in 1974, the US did not deter Turkish aggression. Neither, according to 
popular views, did the British live up to their role as guarantor power. As a 
result, a wave of anti-americanism swept over both Greece and Cyprus. In the 
examination of the Cyprus crisis, the popular view that emerged subsequently, 
mainly in Cyprus and Greece (but also among some non-Greek authors)1 is that 
in 1974 there existed some kind of international conspiracy; according to the 
most extreme manifestations, this conspiracy aimed at the previously agreed 
handover (by the US and / or Britain) of part of Cyprus to Turkey or to the 
partition of the island between Greece and Turkey, in the form of double 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Argyrou (1992), Drousiotis (2001) and Venizelos (2002). Among English language 
works see O'Malley and Craig (1999) and Hitchens (2002). 
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Enosis (union of each of the two parts of the island with its motherland). In this 
context, usually the main conspirators (either directly named or alluded to) are 
the US, Henry Kissinger (then US Secretary of State), the CIA, NATO, Britain 
and the Greek Junta. In this approach the July 1974 coup that overthrew 
President Makarios in Cyprus on 15 July 1974, is seen as the handiwork of the 
CIA, which either encouraged Dimitrios Ioannidis, the strongman of the Athens 
junta to plan and execute it -or, alternatively, gave him its tacit permission to 
implement his plans. 
As regards Britain, public perception of its policy towards the Cyprus 1974 
crisis, in both Greece and Cyprus (and to an extent elsewhere), has traditionally 
followed two paths: it has either considered Britain in the light of a perfidia 
Albio approach (perfidia because it either ‘sold’ Cyprus to Turkey or because it 
refused to face up to its responsibilities as Guarantor Power); or it has largely 
ignored Britain, focussing mainly on the interpretation of the role of the US. 
Both before and after 1974, the question of territory has been one of the most 
important and enduring aspects of the crisis. The percentage of Cypriot 
territory that the Turkish side would control was and has consistently been2 of 
paramount importance: in Cyprus, control of ‘adequate’ territory (no matter 
what numerical value is attached to it) is equated with the viability of state (or 
federal) structures. Post-1974, in the negotiations about the Cyprus issue, return 
of territory has (together with constitutional issues) been central (for the Greek 
side); for the Turkish side, territory has consistently been a highly significant 
                                                 
2
 For this view see eg. Arthur Hartman’s view that territory was “the only lever the Turks had. They 
had to be brought to see that withdrawal was in their long-term interest.” See TNA (The National 
Archives, UK), FCO 9/1922, Record of a conversation between Mr. Callaghan and Mr. A. Hartman at 
the FCO on 8 August 1974 at 10.30 a.m., p. 94. 
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bargaining chip3. In this light, what this paper will look at is Britain’s (and to a 
slightly lesser extent, US) policy towards Cyprus just prior and during the 
Turkish invasion of 1974, with particular emphasis on policy views towards the 
amount of territory that could, would or should be controlled by Turkey in 
Cyprus, slightly before, during and as an outcome of the invasion of 1974. In 
this context we will examine in particular the source of the ‘rule of thirds’ 
regarding the territorial division of Cyprus that has been the final outcome of 
the crisis. We shall also look at the evolution of policy that stemmed -directly 
or indirectly- from views as regards territory; lastly we shall try to look for the 
reasons why ultimately British policy in Cyprus failed. 
The author was led to this approach, from a two-page telegram found in the 
National Archives of Australia (hence referred to as the ‘Australian telegram’, 
see below), in the course of ongoing research on the 1974 Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus. Compared against existing knowledge, this telegram appears to give us 
a very different view of British policy in July 1974; apart from published 
sources, this paper uses evidence drawn from primary sources, mainly British 
archival material in The National Archives (TNA), and US diplomatic papers, 
mainly those published in the Foreign Relations of the United States (Van 
Hook, 2007; henceforth, FRUS). Some additional material is drawn from the 
National Archives of Australia. 
Lastly, this paper will not deal with the responsibilities of the Greek Junta: 
there is no doubt that it gave the orders for the coup against President 
Makarios. Neither is there any doubt that the coup set in motion the chain of 
                                                 
3
 The issue of territory continues (in 2010) to be one of the main sticking points in the ongoing 
negotiations for of the solution of the Cyprus problem. 
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events that followed: even if Turkey intended to invade anyway at some point 
in 1974, the coup provided an ideal opportunity, too good to miss (Asmussen, 
2008:292)4. Lastly, we will not look at the allegations of a pre-invasion deal on 
the division of Cyprus between the Colonels’ regime in Greece and the Turkish 
Government: as with other conspiracy theories, the existing evidence of such a 
deal is weak. 
 
2. Policy at the starting line: the UK on the territorial division of 
Cyprus, July 1974 
Evidence for what the UK had (secretly) expected to be the outcome of the 
Turkish invasion, comes first from the British military experts’ views. Even 
beyond the long-standing Cyprus issue, in November 1973 Turkey had added 
the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf to the list of bilateral 
issues, leading to a general worsening of Greek-Turkish relations. In this 
general context, the British military attachés in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey 
kept supplying relatively detailed information on the armed forces of the 
countries they were accredited to5. Thus, in the months before the 1974 
invasion, the UK government was in possession of detailed and up-to-date 
information regarding both the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot 
Forces6. 
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 See also Nicolet (2001: 419, 428 and passim). 
5
 E.g. TNA, FCO 9/1892, tel. DIG: FOJ 602 171635Z, BNA Athens to MODUK, 17 July 1974; FCO 
9/1891, tel. FOJ 161150Z, BRITDEFAT Ankara to MODUK, 16 July 1974; on the Turkish military 
preparations see TNA, FCO 9/1892, tel. no. FOJ 170955 Z Jul Ankara to MODUK, 17 July 1974. Se 
also notes 9 and 10, below. 
6
 TNA, FCO 9/1973 Military Reports from Cyprus. This file, covering the period 18 Jan  to 20 June 
1974; it includes a detailed “Cyprus Military Report”, dated 23 April 1974, as well as the final 
(“Valedictory”) report of Col. Stocker, the Defence Advisor to the High Commission dated 4 April 
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When the projected Turkish invasion of Cyprus came to the fore, the briefs 
prepared for the 17 July talks between Ecevit and Wilson (just three days 
before the start of the invasion) included a factually correct assessment of 
Greek and Turkish military strengths which stated that geography favoured the 
Turks and that “Greek mainland forces would be unable to [intervene in 
Cyprus] effectively”7.  
Another assessment by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) dated 19 July 
(i.e. shortly before the hostilities started), estimated that Turkey could deploy 
8,000 airborne troops within 12 hours and land one tank and two artillery 
battalions in Cyprus. The assessment continued stating that, 
The Greeks and the Greek Cypriots would almost certainly oppose the Turks 
but we have no doubt that the latter would succeed in attaining their objectives. 
We cannot make any firm prediction as to how long it would take the Turks to 
achieve their military objectives, but we think that most would have been 
achieved within 24 - 48 hours of landing. 
[…] We do not believe that the Greeks could prevent the Turks from attaining 
their objectives 8. 
There are two questions that arise from the above. First, what, according to the 
British military, were the Turkish objectives? According to the same source, it 
                                                                                                                                            
1974;  which also includes the order of battle of both the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot 
forces, as well as details of events of military significance that took place during this period. 
7
 TNA, FCO 9/1892, Military coup in Cyprus (Wednesday 17 July), “Background Brief for the Prime 
Minister for the working dinner for the Prime Minister and the Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. Ecevit and 
Mr. Isik: 17 July 1974”, Confidential, Brief no. 2. The orders of Battle of Greek and Turkish forces are 
included in Annexes A and B. 
8
 See TNA, WO 386/21, JIC(London) to HQ BAOR(G) (Pass JIC Germany), AOCINCNEAF (Pass 
JIG Cyprus), HQ UKLF, HQ STC, CINCFLEET, IMMEDIATE, SECRET, 191450Z JUL, Annex Q, 
to BFNE 1500/24. The telegram was also sent to Harold Wilson (at the time in Paris) as JICTEL 495, 
of 19 JUL 74.  
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was the occupation of the North-Eastern part of Cyprus (from Famagusta to 
Morphou, via the Turkish quarter of Nicosia), an area that would include a 
major port (Famagusta) and an airfield (Tymbou); though it is difficult to have 
a precise estimate, this would be close to 30% of Cyprus. 
The second question is how did the assessments above impact on the 
formulation of UK policy? It has already been said that officially there is 
obviously no public mention of Britain accepting that Turkey occupies by force 
land belonging to the Republic of Cyprus, an independent state, a member of 
the UN and the British Commonwealth and a state for which Britain was itself 
a Guarantor Power. However, evidence from the National Archives of 
Australia seems to imply the opposite, at least for the beginning of the first 
phase of the Turkish invasion. 
 
3. The ‘Australian telegram’ 
The text of the Australian telegram9, seems to offer us a glimpse into a level of 
policy that is seldom allowed to see the light of day (at least not a ‘mere’ 35-
odd years from the event), namely the level where the political and / or 
diplomatic establishments face up to -or even help shape- the developing 
realties on the ground, no matter how unpleasant or painful these may be for 
those immediately concerned. In its first five paragraphs, the Australian 
telegram contains a number of interesting points. It gives an outline of British 
aims and objectives on 20 July, as communicated to the Australian diplomats in 
London by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); it also describes the 
                                                 
9
 The National Archives of Australia, tel. O.LH13267 2130 21.7.74, SECRET, London to. Canberra 
/10734, Ref. 152/2/3 Part 1, Barcode 583852 
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anticipated effects of the Turkish military operations for Cyprus and Greece. 
Particularly its second paragraph seems to shed new light on the early views of 
the British side on the Cyprus crisis. The full transcribed text of the first page 
of the telegram10 is published below (facsimile images of both pages are to be 
found in the Appendix): 
O.LH13267 JG2 
TOR 0749 22.7.74 
O.LH13267  2130 21.7.74 
To. Canberra /10734 
CC. Athens/85   Ankara/65 
From. London 
SECRET 
Cyprus: British Policy 
1. You will have seen media reports of Turkish Invasion of Cyprus on 20 July. FCO 
spokesman has summarized British objectives as being threefold: to protect British lives 
and property; put pressure on Turkey to stop the fighting and on Greece to do nothing to 
make matters worse; and to get takes [sic: talks] started in London.  
2. Commenting privately to us on the situation on 20 July a senior FCO official said that 
Britain secretly would not object if Turkish military forces occupied about 1/3 of the 
island before agreeing to a ceasefire. (Please protect). Such a position would need to be 
reached by 21 July if peace prospects were not to be endangered further. In the meantime, 
Britain continued to support publicly appeals for an immediate ceasefire. 
3. According to the same source reports from the British Ambassador in Athens express 
concern that the present military regime in Greece may fall and be replaced by an even 
less desirable one. There is some feeling on the FCO that were Greece to intervene 
militarily in a land war with Turkey she would end up with a “bloody nose”. 
4. In his London talks last week Makarios asked the British frankly what he should do. He 
was encouraged to go ahead with his plan to got to New York and await developments 
there. There seems little prospect of his returning to Cyprus in the near future, if at all. 
Some observers have suggested the President of the Cypriot National Assembly as a 
possible alternative Head of State to Sampson who is unacceptable to the Turks. 
5. Britain is acting diplomatically, not militorily [sic: militarily], in the current crisis. The 
only military moves have been related strictly to the improvement of the security of the 
Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). Over the last 24 hours some 1500 British troops have been 
flown to Cyprus for this purpose.  
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 The contents of the second page (paragraphs 6 and 7) appear much less important. They refer to the 
evacuation of foreign nationals by the British Forces in Cyprus (paragraph 6) and an FCO request to 
the Libyan government for Quantas overflights of Libya. There is also a handwritten note below the 
text of the first page, signed by Hugh Gilchrist, a career Australian diplomat, who had been the 
Ambassador to Greece (and Cyprus) during 1970-72. The text of the note refers to Glafkos Clerides 
and the question of a constitutional successor to Makarios in the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus. 
The text is transcribed in the Appendix. Its author later went on to write a monumental history of the 
Greeks in Australia. See Gilchrist (2004). 
  8 
As is observable in the text, the secret “cablegram” (as Australian parlance 
describes it) was sent by the Australian High Commission in London to 
Canberra, in the evening (London time) of 21 July 1974. Neither date nor 
time11 is given concerning the meeting with the FCO mentioned in paragraph 2, 
but it would be logical to assume that it took place at some point during 21 
July12. 
It is necessary here to open a parenthesis to examine why the FCO considered 
it important to make the Australians privy to such a sensitive piece of 
information. It is true that in 1974 Australia had behind it almost six decades of 
involvement in the affairs (mainly military) of the Eastern Mediterranean, 
beginning with the ANZAC (Australian  and New Zealand Army Corps) 
involvement in the Dardanelles campaign and continuing to Crete in 1941. By 
1974, Australia also had a substantial Greek community (part of it composed of 
Greek-Cypriots, though the bulk of migrants from Cyprus arrived in Australia 
after 1974). 
However, historical and other ties notwithstanding, in 1974 Australia did not 
even have diplomatic representation in situ in Cyprus (the Australian 
Ambassador in Athens was also accredited to Nicosia). Australian subjects 
resident on the island only numbered a few score persons13. Indeed, in 1974 
                                                 
11
 The author has tried to find evidence of briefings the FCO may have conducted on 20 or 21 July 
1974, but the reply from the FCO in-house historians was that all relevant material has been transferred 
to the National Archives in Kew. Though the research is ongoing, no other traces of a private briefing 
for the Australians have up to now been located. 
12
 A meeting at the FCO on 20 July, though possible is unlikely: this would mean that the Australian 
High Commission waited for a period of up to -or even more than- 24 hours before transmitting 
sensitive and urgent information to Canberra. 
13
 According to the UK Ministry of Defence News Release no 38/74 of 26 July 1974, of the 7,526 
persons evacuated to the UK from Cyprus, 2,355 were not British subjects; 151 of these were 
Australians. See TNA, AIR 8/2656, Ministry of Defence News Release, 38/74, 26 July 1974. 
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Australia’s most substantial presence in Cyprus was its contribution to 
UNFICYP, in the form of a civilian police (CIVPOL) element14. 
While there is no explicit answer, the most plausible explanation seems to lie in 
the fact that in 1974, Australia was also a non-permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council. The other members were Austria, the Byelorussian 
Soviet Republic, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania and 
Cameroon. Thus, if we discount the neutral Austria, Australia was the only 
western country and probably the only one among the members of this group 
on which Britain could depend15. This, together with the traditional links 
between the two countries (and possibly the Australian Police Contingent 
serving with UNFICYP), probably explains why the FCO chose to privately 
brief Australia, passing on information on the secret views of the British 
Government. 
Turning to the content of the Australian telegram, the first paragraph sets out 
the openly declared British objectives; they are the same as those contained (in 
expanded form) in FCO tel. no. 151, of 20 July, sent to no less than eight 
British diplomatic missions (including Ankara and Moscow) and copied for 
information to a further eight.16. All three objectives are highly commendable; 
the citizens of any country have a right to expect it will do anything in its 
power to protect them. Since at least the 1960s, fighting is officially seen as an 
undesirable development, justified in self-defence and -less frequently- as a last 
                                                 
14
 On 19 July 1974 there were 35 Australian Police officers in Cyprus. See Australian National 
Archives, tel. O.CE 153 19.7.74 UNC, Commander AUSTCIVPOL, Cyprus to Foreign Office [sic], 
Canberra, File 152/2/3 Part 1. See also Henn (2004: 17). 
15
 See e.g. TNA, FCO 9/1897, United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 
Seventeen Hundred and Eighty-Second Meeting, Monday, 22 July 1974. 
16
 TNA, FCO 9/1875 “Military coup against President Makarios in Cyprus 15 July 1974”, FCO tel no. 
151, 20 July 1974; the telegram was sent at 0700 hrs.  
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resort when all else has failed, or as a means to redress the effects of 
aggression. Any peace-loving country (and virtually all countries want to be 
considered such) wishes to avoid military conflict; when conflict erupts, the 
international community generally wishes it to remain limited in time and 
space; indeed the reference to Greece in this paragraph may be interpreted in 
this light; and it is expected that even after the conflict has come to being, the 
differences that caused it will be solved by talks between those involved. Thus 
there seems to be nothing out of the ordinary in the first paragraph. 
 
4. An unequivocal (but secret) UK position?  
Paragraph 2 of the Australian telegram is probably the most important in the 
text; it is indeed clear from the special ‘please protect’ phrase, that the 
significance of the information contained here was not lost on the Australians 
(the alternative is that it could have been requested of them, which would again 
stress the importance of its content). There are three surprising statements in 
this paragraph:  
A. The readiness of Britain to accept in Cyprus a fait accomplit, a result of the 
Turkish military action already underway.  
B. The specific time-scale set for the completion of military action: the 
occupation of one third of the island would have to be completed within 48 
hours of the beginning of the invasion.  
C. The fact there is a specifically defined area -one third of the island- that 
Britain would ‘suffer’ Turkey to occupy; it should also be noted that this 
territorial extent matches the area of Cyprus described as the Turkish military 
objectives in the British military experts’ report (see above) as well as the area 
occupied by Turkey three-odd weeks after the date of the telegram, following 
the second wave of hostilities, in 14-16 August 1974. 
Theoretically the contents of this paragraph could be the result of a 
misunderstanding; or the private views of an individual (albeit high-level) 
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official in the FCO; or it could (always in theory) express the collective views 
of the FCO bureaucracy adopting the military experts’ views. However, all the 
above appear highly unlikely. The reference to Britain in the text implies state 
policy, to which James Callaghan, the Secretary of State has to have agreed. 
Cyprus was certainly not the centre of the universe for UK foreign policy, but it 
had been at the forefront of foreign affairs since the 15 July coup, enough time 
to force Britain to consider policy options. 
 
4.1. Britain: readiness, resignation or complicity?  
Of the three questions above, the readiness of Britain to accept in Cyprus a fait 
accomplit, may be interpreted as acquiescence to a course of events that may be 
considered unjust, but is (according to Britain) unavoidable. The Turkish 
invasion was underway, and, at that stage, Britain was not prepared to stop it. 
The experts were also clear in that the operation could not be stopped. As 
elaborated in paragraph 5 of the telegram, as long as the security of the 
immediate British interests in Cyprus (mainly the Sovereign Base Areas) was 
not in danger, there would be no requirement to intervene in order to influence 
the course of events. Lastly, neither the USSR17 nor the US or, for that matter, 
the UN (despite a substantial increase in UNFICYP troops), appeared inclined 
to intervene with more than diplomacy to stop the developing conflict18. 
                                                 
17
 On 21 July, the British Ambassador in Moscow, after informing the FCO that the Turkish 
Ambassador had met Gromyko on 19 and 20 July, put forward the view that “the Russians may have 
connived at the landings”. See TNA, FCO 9/1896, Moscow to FCO, tel. no. 868, 21 July 1974. 
18
 For the US concerns about the USSR see e.g. Kissinger (2000: 207-223), Nicolet (2001: 429-447).  
For the UN see Waldheim (1985: 82-83) and Urquhart (1987: 255-257).  
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4.2. Why a ‘deadline’? 
The time scale given in the telegram is slightly more obscure. One possible 
source for the choice of the deadline of 21 July is the time included in the UK 
military assessments that expected the Turkish operation to be complete within 
24 to 48 hours (see above)19. Another possible (though a little less likely) 
source of the time frame could be a telegram sent on 20 July by Sir Robin 
Hooper, the UK Ambassador in Athens. In it he reported a conversation with 
Kypraios, the acting Foreign Minister of Greece, in the course of which, 
Kypraios stated that:  
6. […] In regard to the Greek demands, the cardinal point was of course the 
cease-fire. But the Greek military also attached great importance to the 
concentration of Turkish forces. However he did not think they would insist 
on the operation being completed by 1400 so long as it was carried out within 
the next 24 or 48 hours [underline added].20 
Either way, the information from this conversation included in the telegram 
would seem to fit with the British military assessments and with the time frame 
included in the text of the Australian telegram. 
When looking to explain the 48 hour ‘window’ set in this paragraph, one 
should also take into consideration the permanent western fear of a generalised 
Greek-Turkish war and of the effect this would have on NATO as well as on 
the anticipated future settlement in Cyprus; to this one should add the fear of 
theoretically possible Soviet intervention – a factor less probable but present at 
different degrees throughout the crisis); and the possible reaction of the 
                                                 
19
 The Turkish invasion began at daybreak on 20 July (around 0600 hrs local time). Thus 48 hrs from 
the start would strictly speaking take the operation to the early hours of 22 July (not 21, as the telegram 
says). However, one could argue that military operations of this scale hardly ever follow prepared 
timetables – hence the time difference. 
20
 TNA, FCO 9/1895, tel. no. 237, Athens to FCO, 20 July 1974. The telegram was sent on 11:15 
GMT, after a 0915 Athens time meeting with Kypraios. 
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international public opinion21. In any event, as already shown, 48 hours was 
deemed militarily adequate for the success of Turkish aims and not long 
enough to become the cause of a wider conflict. Lastly, as regards time, it 
should be noted that the first ceasefire (admittedly brokered by the US) in 
Cyprus was to take effect on 21 July, at 1600 hrs local time, ie within the 48 
hour window. The second ceasefire did come into effect 24 hrs later, on 1600 
of 22 July (Asmussen, 2008:105-109, 101-111).  
 
4.3. Britain, Cyprus and the ‘rule of thirds’ 
The third question, the extent of territory Turkey would occupy as a result of its 
invasion is much more intriguing. It is not the first time that the ‘rule of thirds’ 
(one third Turkish, two thirds Greek) appears in the Cyprus problem. In 1957, 
Dr. Fazıl Küçük, then leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, had published 
the book The Cyprus Question – A Permanent Solution, on whose cover the 
island of Cyprus was divided along the 35th Parallel, with an area roughly 
coinciding to a similar one-third – two-thirds division (Soulioti, 2006). 
According to the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, the public 
servants would be divided at a ratio of two thirds Greek-Cypriot to one third 
Turkish-Cypriot; and in March 1964, the UN mediator Gallo Plaza, noted in his 
                                                 
21
 According to a British report from Athens, the US Military Attaché expected Greece to declare war 
on Turkey on 22 July. See TNA, FCO 9/1876, Athens to MODUK, tel. FOG 368, 21 July 1974. On the 
Soviet angle as seen by the US, see eg. Telegram, Department of State to Certain Posts, Washington, 
July 18, 1974, 2354Z, 156312. Subject: Policy Considerations in Cyprus Situation, particularly paras. 1 
and 8, in FRUS, p. 322; Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group [henceforth: 
WSAG], Washington, July 22, 1974, 10:42–11:25 a.m., in FRUS, p. 379-380; Briefing Memorandum 
From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State 
Kissinger,Washington, July 22, 1974 in FRUS, p. 367; Department of State, Cyprus Critique, 
Secretary’s Conference Room, Monday, August 5, 1974, Secret, p. 7, 9 in http://www.foia.cia.gov; 
Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 15, 1974, 4:30 p.m., SUBJECT Cyprus, in FRUS, 
p. 443. On British fears of Soviet intervention see TNA, FCO 9/1895, UKMIS New York to FCO, tel. 
no. 810, 20 July 1974: “We should need to avoid anything which could justify independent action by 
third army (Red Army in blue berets).” 
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report to U Thant, the then UN Secretary General, that the Turkish proposals 
for Cyprus entailed the request for a Turkish zone in the northern part of 
Cyprus, “[beginning] at the village of Gialia on the northeast coast [of Cyprus] 
passing through the centre of Nicosia and east of Famagusta [sic]. […] It is 
claimed that this zone covers an area of approximately 1084 square miles or 
38% of the total area of Cyprus” (Clerides, 1991:163 and Soulioti, 2006:761). 
However, HM Government’s acquiescence to the ‘rule of thirds’ contrasts with 
the stated minimum Turkish ‘war aims’ as set out to the British side on 17 July 
1974, in the course of the meeting between Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan and Bulent Ecevit and Hasan Isik, the acting foreign minister of 
Turkey. This was a top level meeting, involving high level political office 
holders -the Prime Ministers of Britain and Turkey, and two cabinet ministers 
for each side. On the British side another seven officials participated, while the 
Turkish side included four ambassadors, the head of the Cyprus and Greek 
affairs Department in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and two generals (in all 11 
persons) 22. In the meeting Bulend Ecevit said that, 
The minimum Turkish requirement in the future, whatever the status of 
Cyprus – independent or “whatever other arrangement” – would be to secure 
access to the sea somewhere near Turkey, which would enable his 
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 TNA, FCO 9/1892, Military coup in Cyprus (Wednesday 17 July), “Record of Conversation between 
the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary and the Prime 
Minister, the Acting Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior after dinner at 10, Downing st., on 
Wednesday 17 July 1974”. The other persons in the UK delegation were: Roy Mason (Secretary of 
State for Defence), Sir Thomas Brimelow (Permanent Undersecretary of State, FCO), Sir John Killick 
(Deputy Under-Secretary, FCO), Charles Wiggin (FCO), Arthur Hockaday (Deputy Under-Secretary of 
State Ministry of Defence), Alan Goodison (Head of the SE European Department), Joe Haines (Press 
Secretary to the PM) and Lord Bridges (Thomas Edward Bridges, 2nd Baron Bridges, Private Secretary 
(Overseas Affairs) to the Prime Minister). The Turkish delegation comprised Bulend Etcevit (PM), 
Hasan Isik (Acting Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence), Oguzhan Asilturk (Minister of the 
Interior), Haluk Bayulken (special adviser and former Foreign Minister), Turgut Menemencioglu 
(Ambassador to the UK), Orhan Eralp (Ambassador to NATO), Ercumen Yavuzalp (Ambassador, 
Director General of the International Security Department, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Ecmel 
Barutcu (Head of the Cyprus and Greek Affairs Department, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
Generals Haydar Saltik and Kemal Yamak (General Staff) and A. Alacakaptan (Turkish Embassy in 
London). 
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Government to prevent Turks from dying from starvation as had occurred in 
the past23.  
To achieve this, the Turkish side asked for British cooperation (in the form of 
allowing them to use the SBAs) for a military intervention in Cyprus. The 
British side was not ready to accept such a plan; use of the SBAs remained out 
of the question; they offered to mediate and get Greece to the negotiating table 
(an offer to which Turkey was at best indifferent) (Asmussen, 2008:59-63). The 
closest the two sides appear to have got to some form of military cooperation in 
the course of the meeting was when, 
“The Prime Minister said that he understood Mr Ecevit`s remarks as an 
expression of the Turkish wish that Britain would not blockade an 
action of the kind contemplated by Turkey, but that they would 
blockade the Greeks. Mr Ecevit asked if Britain would be ready to do 
so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said it was not 
impossible.”24  
Thus, at least by the evening of 17 July, there seems to have been no clear 
agreement for cooperation, even though both Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan appeared impressed by the Turkish side25; indeed, there is some 
distance between the cooperation asked for (to which Callaghan replied with a 
double negative), and the acquiescence to the occupation by Turkey of a third 
of Cyprus, as the Australian telegram expressly states three days later. 
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 TNA, FCO 9/1892, Military coup in Cyprus (Wednesday 17 July), “Record of Conversation …” p. 4. 
According to Ecevit, this cooperation would be welcomed by everybody, the Greek and Cypriot people 
included, would restore democracy to Greece, would justify British military presence in Cyprus and 
also restore NATO unity in the region… 
24
 TNA, FCO 9/1892, “Record of Conversation …” p. 12. This acquiescence seems the closest Britain 
got to cooperation with Turkey. It could be argued that the Turkish proposal to use the SBAs was an 
opening bid, aimed at getting this acquiescence by the British side. 
25
 See Donoughue (2005: 166): “HW [Harold Wilson] was very impressed by them [the Turks]. See 
also Sir John Killick, interview by John Hutson, 14/2/2002, p. 28:  “It was very interesting to see Jim 
Callaghan handling it [the crisis in Cyprus]. He had a good deal of sympathy, let’s face it, with the 
Turks, who’d had a pretty raw deal. Nobody loved Makarios after all, but we couldn’t afford to see this 
awful man, Nico Sampson taking over.” 
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How was the gap bridged? How did the ‘rule of thirds’ come into the 
Australian telegram as something Britain was prepared to see happen, albeit 
secretly? Τhe author of this paper does not subscribe to conspiracy theories; 
thus we do not interpret the reference in the telegram to “1/3 of the island 
before agreeing to a ceasefire” as an expression of a British aim. One possible 
interpretation could be that in this paragraph the “senior FCO official”26 
appears, once more, to state what Britain was expecting to happen and 
therefore what Britain was ready to accept on the first day of the Turkish 
invasion, given the likelihood of success of the latter, as forecast by its own 
military experts.  
Conspiracy theorists would be tempted to look for the US influence on British 
policy. Thus here is perhaps a suitable point to look briefly at the US policy 
towards Cyprus at the time.  
 
5. A common policy? US policy and expectations 
As regards the objectives of the US indications are that, since the coup of 15 
July, US policy had been evolving27. On 18 July, in the meeting of the 
Washington Special Actions Group, Kissinger seemed unclear: though he 
accepted the possibility of Turkish intervention, he also asked to be briefed on 
the availability of military forces for use in Cyprus (both US and British), but 
                                                 
26
 We can only speculate as to the identity of the official: persons with seniority in the FCO at the time 
whose names appear in the files were Sir Thomas (later Lord) Brimelow (1915-1995) the Permanent 
Undersecretary FCO (1973-75), Sir John Killick (1919-2004), the Deputy Under Secretary of State, 
FCO and Sir Alan Goodison (1926-2006), the Head of the Southern European Department. 
27
 Thus, on 17 July the main decision taken in the conversation between Pres. Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger was that the US would neither openly oppose nor support Makarios, see FRUS, pp. 311-312; 
His other concerns in the 18 July meeting were the fear of an increase in “Soviet/East bloc influence”; 
while “Preventing a Greek-Turkish war and a shift in the balance of power are factors”, see FRUS p. 
317). Cf. FRUS, p. 316: “We do not want to elaborate a theme for Soviet intervention, or Turkish.” 
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decided that “We do not want to tip our hand on a Cyprus solution yet til [sic] 
we know what will come out of it”28. Referring to US public statements, he 
also added “Just repeat our standard line on the territorial integrity of 
Cyprus”29. 
Was the US administration aware of Turkish territorial goals? According to an 
oral account, on 15 July 1974, William R. Crawford Jr., a US diplomat who 
had served in Cyprus until 1972 and was in Washington when news of the coup 
against Makarios came, had warned William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary 
International Organizations, and an unnamed member of the NSC that in his 
view the coup would lead to a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the occupation 
of a third of the island:  
Question: "How much of Cyprus do they want to take? All of Cyprus? 
I said, "No. They'll go for the northern third, which is enough to establish 
strategic control over the island.30  
Once the invasion had begun, the above was further confirmed. On the evening 
of 19 July (the early morning hours of the 20th July in Cyprus), a conversation 
between Henry Kissinger and William Colby, then Director of the CIA, after a 
discussion of the military information available on the invasion forces and the 
relative military strengths of Greece and Turkey, the conversation continued on 
the territorial goals: 
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 Meeting of the WSAG, Washington, July 18, 1974, in FRUS, pp. 315. 
29
 There was also the decision not to stop deliveries of military aid to Greece or worry whether 
Ioannides` regime in Greece survived or not, see FRUS, p. 316. The essence of the above was included 
in tel. Telegram 156312, From the Department of State to Certain Posts,  Subject: Policy 
Considerations in Cyprus Situation, date Washington, July 18, 1974, 2354Z, in FRUS, p. 322. 
30
 See, interview with William R. Crawford (1988). Both Buffum and Crawford were later involved in 
Cypriot affairs: Buffum was the US representative in the first stage of the Geneva talks in July 1974; 
Crawford was sent to Cyprus to replace Ambassador Roger Davies, following the latter’s assassination 
on 19 August 1974. 
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K[issinger]: But what do you think they’re after? They’re not after the whole 
island are they? 
C[olby]: No, no. What they would be after would be Famagusta and Kyrenia 
and kind of a line between the two. 
K: That kind of a quadrangle in the northeast. 
C: Yeah. Well, call it almost the (inaudible) from roughly Baranaka31 on up 
and then just assert themselves and give themselves a position to bargain with. 
[…] 
K: Do you have any good ideas what we should do? 
C: Well, I think the biggest thing is to get the Greeks not to fight. To say all 
right, let’s negotiate and discuss what ought to be done. 
K: OK.32 
One should note here that the geographical area outlined as the target of the 
Turkish invasion is, again, the northern “third” of Cyprus (between Famagusta 
and Kyrenia, though later some confusion seems to ensue). 
An indication of the movement of the US policy towards acceptance of the rule 
of thirds is furnished by another Australian telegram, this time from Ankara, 
that stated that “Although Turks may not have achieved full military 
objectives [emphasis added], Americans here believe that they may now be 
ready to accept a ceasefire”; and further “Americans […] consider they [the 
Turks] would not be willing to surrender areas captured, except for minor 
adjustments, but will seek to hold these so as to secure permanent access to sea 
and security of Turkish minority. As a consequence some movement of 
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 Baranaka is a place name in Indonesia and so a mistake; the closest one could find in Cyprus is 
Larnaca, which is however in the southern part of the island. The only way Larnaca could be the target 
of the Turkish invasion would be if this took place eg in the British base of Dekeleia, in the SE and 
then the Turkish forces moved towards the SW (to Larnaca) rather than N (to Famagusta). Even so, this 
sounds implausible and (if ‘Baranaka’ means Larnaca) it would point to a gross failure of intelligence 
by the US. Larnaca is also incompatible with the references to Famagusta and Kyrenia a little 
previously in the same conversation. Similar confusion (the main thrust of the Turkish invasion is 
placed in the north and east of Cyprus, “in order to cut off a north eastern quadrant where the bulk of 
the Turkish population in Cyprus lived” is to be found in National Archives of Australia, Department 
of Foreign Affairs, file 152/2/3 Part 1, tel. O.WH 7601, Washington to Canberra, 20.7.74, reporting 
information by given by Arthur Hartman, US Assistant Secretary of State. 
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 Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Director of Central 
Intelligence Colby, July 19, 1974, 9:35 p.m. PDT in FRUS, p. 334 and p. 335 
  19 
population might therefore be involved”33. Along the same lines, on 22 July, 
the Cyprus Task Force of the Washington Special Action Group, noted in its 
first paper “It should be noted that Turkish military occupation of the island’s 
northeastern third does not of itself constitute a viable partition solution 
(although it may lay the basis for one)…”34. 
However all these were in the course of private briefings and confidential or 
secret communications; officially, on 20 July, in the meeting of the Washington 
Special Actions Group, Ambassador Robert McCloskey outlined the basic 
policy objectives of the US regarding Cyprus as, 
“(1) support a ceasefire; (2) get both Greece and Turkey to agree on 
negotiations with the British, in London; and (3) that our objective is to see 
the reestablishment of constitutional rule in Cyprus.” 35 
It should be noted that, these official US aims are essentially the same as the 
British ones (stated, among others, in the Australian telegram, above) with the 
exception of the issue of British lives and property, for which the US had 
obviously no responsibility. The interesting aspect is, once more, the territorial 
question. 
 
6. Military Assessments  
As the events showed, detailed information notwithstanding, the UK military 
experts seem to have overestimated the ability of the Turkish Armed Forces 
and / or seriously underestimated the ability and willingness of the Greek-
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 National Archives of Australia, tel. O.AN244, Ankara to Canbera no. 377, 21.7.74. Turkish surprise 
at the extent of Greek resistance is also mentioned in the telegram as well as the “inability to achieve a 
quick victory”. 
34
 WSAG, Cyprus Task Force, “Paper No. 1, Cyprus: Issues and Options”, 22 July, in FRUS, p. 367. 
35
 See eg. summary of US policy in WSAG, July 20, 1974, 11:07 a.m.–12:07 p.m., SUBJECT Cyprus, 
in FRUS, p. 343; Kissinger did not attend this meeting. See also Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 219. 
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Cypriot National Guard to resist the invasion36. By 1600 hrs on 22 July (when 
the US-brokered ceasefire came into effect in Cyprus) the territory of the 
Republic of Cyprus occupied by Turkey was still relatively small (probably 
around under 4% of the total)37; though no precise data exists, it appears that 
the 4% mark was probably reached sometime in early August; this was after the 
continuous armed incursions of the Turkish Forces and the fighting of the 
period 22-30 July. The Geneva Declaration signed on 30 July by the Foreign 
Ministers of Greece, Turkey and Britain, was supposed to put an end to the 
clashes; however, further fighting broke out subsequently, lasting intermittently 
for the first ten days of August. During this time the Turkish-occupied area was 
further enlarged: according to the opening statement of the Greek Foreign 
Minister George Mavros in the second round of the Geneva Conference, the 
Turkish army had expanded the zone it occupied by 130 square kilometres 
between 22 July and 8 August (or approx. 1,4% of the total land area)38. To 
outside observers, the question of control of territory by the Turkish Army in 
Cyprus would still seem to indicate limited overall success for the Turkish 
operation, despite the gradual increase in the strength of the Turkish military 
presence in Cyprus. 
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 See TNA, FCO 9/1895, tel. no. 2442, Washington to FCO: “US diplomatic efforts were now being 
devoted to urging maximum restraint on the Greek Government and on the National Guard not to 
respond”. Cf Miller (2008: 194) and Birand (1984: 215). 
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 The area controlled by the Turkish Cypriots after the 1963-64 intercommunal clashes was rather 
small. According to a letter of the Director of the Cyprus Lands and Surveys Department dated 17 
September 1964, the area under Turkish Cypriot control was 60 square miles, well under 2% of the 
area of Cyprus. See Soulioti (2006: 749 and accompanying map in the map supplement). This area did 
not grow substantially between 1964 and the Turkish invasion of 1974. Turan Gunes, the Turkish 
Foreign Minister, is quoted telling James Callaghan on Saturday 10 August 1974 that Turkish forces in 
Cyprus controlled 1/25th of the total area of Cyprus, i.e. 4%. See Birand (n.d.: 274). 
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 See TNA, FCO 9/1921, Greek Embassy (London) Press and Information Office Press Release, 9th 
August 1974, p. 2. See also FCO 9/1897, C 74(77), 22 July 1974, Cabinet, Cyprus; Cf. TNA, FCO 
9/1897 BRITDEFAT Ankara to MODUK tel. FOJ 222010Z July 1974 and Kazamias (2009a: 273-
282). According to Birand (n.d.: 24), the area the Turkish army controlled on the eve of the second 
stage of the invasion was 448 sq. km., or approximately 4,8% of Cyprus. 
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This did not go unremarked. Indeed, both the British and the US remarked on 
Turkey’s failure to secure control of the significant part of Cyprus they had 
predicted. On 22 July, a note on Cyprus submitted to the British Cabinet, 
jointly by the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office, stated that “the 
Turks […] badly misjudged the potential extent of National Guard Resistance” 
and concluded that “there is no question now of a quick victory”39. The gap 
between the expected outcome and reality was also reflected in the conclusions 
of the Cabinet meeting of 22 July, where it was noted that "The Turks must be 
disappointed at the meagre success of their armed intervention"40. On the same 
day, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, the British ambassador to the US repeated the 
point to Henry Kissinger, voiced as concern that the performance of the 
Turkish troops, would imply serious effects for the whole of the southern flank 
of NATO, as the Turks “did not appear able to handle modern weapons well” 41. 
Across the Atlantic, US’s own military assessments of Turkish performance 
were even more disparaging. On 21 July, Kissinger, speaking about the Turkish 
leadership (military and political) remarked to the Washington Special Actions 
Group: “If their [the Turkish] generals are as bad as their leaders, what can 
their captains and majors be like!”42 Similar remarks were repeated in the same 
forum, the next day (22 July), when Kissinger even appeared to have doubts 
about the ability of the Turkish Army to hold its own in Cyprus: 
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 TNA, CAB 124/178, “Cyprus, Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet” (Sir John Hunt), Cabinet Office, 
22 July 1974, p. 3 para. 5. 
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 See TNA, CAB/128/55, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on 
Monday 22 July 1974, p. 1. Cf. National Archives of Australia, tel. O.AN246 Ankara to Canbera no. 
379, dated 22.7.74.  
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Ramsbotham, British Ambassador to the United States, Washington, July 22, 1974, 4:30 p.m. in FRUS, 
p. 387. The failure to capture Nicosia Airport (which was still in the hands of the National Guard on 22 
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 WSAG, July 21, 1974, 9:33–11:23 a.m., Subject: Cyprus, in FRUS, p. 357. Similar arguments seem 
to be echoed in The National Archives of Australia, tel. O.AN 246, Ankara to Canberra, 22.7.74 in 
152/2/3 Part 2, Barcode 588486. 
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Secretary Kissinger: Why were the Turks so incompetent? 
Gen. Walters: Well, I think that one-to-five ratio was a big factor. They (the 
Turks) couldn’t even take Nicosia airport. 
Gen. Brown: I think history will show that they were rather inept in the whole 
operation. I think analysis will show that their whole situation was amateurish. 
Their air support was ineffective. 
[…] 
Secretary Kissinger: How is it that they are so incompetent? Are they (the 
Turks) really that strong on the island then? 
Gen. Walters: Well, I don’t know .43 
It is the author’s opinion that a divergence between UK and US policy began at 
approximately this point. Though beginning from the same starting point (the 
ceasefire and the end of large scale fighting in Cyprus) and the same military 
assessment (the apparent failure of Turkey to achieve its territorial aims in 
Cyprus), the two main western players in the Cyprus crisis reached different 
conclusions and explored different options. Possibly from the ceasefire and 
more probably from the first Geneva meeting (25-30 July) James Callaghan 
chose active involvement in the search for a solution to the crisis; since it 
appeared that there was a will (of sorts) by both Turkey and Greece to 
negotiate, negotiations were to be the next step. And if need be, the UK could 
consider backing up its policy with some military muscle (Polyviou, 2010:147-
148, 170-171).  
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7. Callaghan’s involvement and the military option  
It appears that the military assessments of the Turkish invasion operations in 
July 1974, helped shape a new UK policy regarding Cyprus. Indeed, from 
approximately the first ceasefire (on 22 July) until the beginning of the military 
operations for the second phase of the Turkish invasion, James Callaghan 
seems to have abandoned the territorial policy described in the Australian 
telegram. What appears to have been adopted instead was what could be called 
the ‘one-shot policy’. According to this, Turkey had had its chance to get what 
it wanted in Cyprus and had failed. Now negotiations would have to shape the 
future of Cyprus. Furthermore, after the ceasefire of 22 July and even more so 
after the conclusion (on 30 July) of the Stage I negotiations in Geneva, Britain 
apparently assumed that at least the main part of the fighting in Cyprus was 
over; the other assumption seems to have been that Britain had the option of 
using its forces in Cyprus as a tool to impel the parties involved (mainly 
Turkey, which was openly reinforcing its army in Cyprus) towards a negotiated 
agreement on Cyprus, an agreement that might even prove to be the hitherto 
elusive final settlement. 
That negotiations were seen as the next step for Britain is implied from the 
comments in the British Cabinet (that assumed failure of the Turkish invasion, 
see above); from the enthusiasm of the British delegation after the signing of 
the Geneva Declaration on 30 July44; the effort put in by Britain in the 
demarcation of the ceasefire line in Cyprus (Kazamias, 2009a); and even from 
the Steering Brief prepared on 7 August for the UK Delegation to the second 
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  “…we came away from Geneva fairly euphoric”. “On the journey home, everybody was on a high 
and when they got to the airport, they sat on their suitcases and sang a patriotic song: ‘It wasn’t Rule 
Britannia but it was something daft’ recalled McNally. ‘Everybody felt that we’d cracked it.’ ”. See 
O’Malley and Craig (1999: 203). 
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round of the Geneva talks, which predicted that “With five delegations 
participating and the threat of war receding, the danger is that other delegations 
will dig in for a very long session.” 45 
Let us now turn to the issue of British military intervention, or using ‘military 
muscle’, as is sometimes referred to. Was military intervention an option for 
the UK?  
Even in the recent past, it was certainly far from unheard of: according to one 
study, between 1949 and 1970, Britain had intervened militarily on 34 
occasions; most of these interventions (29 of the 34) took place in former 
British Colonies and 27 of 30 in areas where “an [British] Army base existed 
within or immediately adjacent to the border” (Van Wingen and Tillema, 
1980:296) of the country where the intervention took place. 
Was intervention possible in Cyprus? After the coup against President 
Makarios, the British Forces on the island were increased significantly. 
Between 15 and 26 July, the British forces in the Sovereign Base Areas the 
army elements stationed in Cyprus rose in number from just under 3000 
officers and men on 15 July 1974 to over 5500 on 26 July. Further 
reinforcements (a Gurkha unit) were sent to Cyprus between 11 and 13 August, 
raising the number of British officers and men to 564046. Among the 
reinforcements in war materiel were 12 state of the art Phantom aircraft. The 
naval units available in Cyprus were strengthened by HMS Hermes (an 
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 See eg. TNA, FCO 9/1920, Steering Brief for the United Kingdom Delegation to Stage II of the 
Geneva Talks on Cyprus, FCO, 7th August 1974, p. 2 para. 5. 
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 TNA, DEFE 13/1251, Select Committee on Cyprus, Memorandum. According to TNA, DEFE 
13/1251, “Select Committee on Cyprus, Memorandum by Minster of Defence”, undated [28 October 
1975], the 41st Marine Commando Unit was withdrawn at the end of July 1974; the withdrawal of the 
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reinforced with artillery elements. 
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amphibious assault ship carrying a Royal Marine unit), three other surface 
ships, a submarine and other auxiliary units47. 
It is true that in the beginning of the crisis no military action was envisaged by 
Britain (see, among other sources, paragraph 5 of the Australian telegram, 
above); however, this approach was apparently abandoned even before the 
territorial issue, after the first day or so of the invasion. In fact, in 1974 Britain 
used its military forces in Cyprus repeatedly for a variety of missions. British 
land forces were used to evacuate foreign nationals by land to the SBAs on 20-
21 July48; British naval units were used for the same purpose for the northern 
coast of Cyprus; in both cases, the use of combat air patrol had been authorised 
to protect the British forces49, while for the naval units authorisation for the 
British ships to return fire had been mooted50. Days later, on 23-25 July, Britain 
came very close to using force against the Turkish troops, when the Turkish 
Army challenge to UNFICYP over the Nicosia Airport brought (according to 
Harold Wilson) the UK and Turkey to “within an hour of war”51.  
Further on in the crisis, at the request of James Callaghan active military 
involvement by British Forces was considered twice. The first was on 25-26 
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 For the Phantoms see TNA, DEFE 24/1794, DOC/117/DO, Defence Operations Centre Situation 
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July, when the possibility a British naval blockade of the northern shores of 
Cyprus to stop Turkish reinforcements was actively explored at the request of 
Callaghan himself52. The second came during the second Stage of the Geneva 
negotiations: between 9 and 12 August (Kazamias, 2008, 2009b), Callaghan 
explored the possibility of interposing the UN forces in Cyprus, beefed-up by 
British forces from the SBAs, between the Turkish forces and the Greek-
Cypriot National Guard, in order to contain the expected Turkish advance53. It 
is true that on both these cases there were doubts expressed by the British 
military as to the efficiency of British involvement: when the blockade was 
discussed, it was judged, that “Interposition of R[oyal] N[avy] was too grave a 
step at this stage, would have serious consequences and might not affect the 
ground situation”54. Similar doubts were later voiced for the use of ground 
troops55. Despite the doubts on the feasibility of military intervention, the fact 
that Callaghan kept the option alive should be considered in tandem with his 
very active stance in Geneva, where he alluded that British forces in Cyprus 
might even be entering the fray against Turkey (Callaghan, 1987:351).  
A recent account of the period has argued that contrary to other assessments 
that joint or assisted intervention by Turkey and the UK (as proposed by the 
former in the 17 July talks) would have contained “…Turkish operations and 
prevented partition” (Asmussen, 2008:294); while counterfactual arguments are 
of limited value, it is the author’s view the same could have been the outcome 
had Britain used its troops in Cyprus in August 1974, as a cordon sanitaire 
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between Greeks and Turks. In this vein, it could be argued that given the 
previous caution shown by the invading Turkish Forces, it is unlikely that a 
‘shooting war’ would have broken out. If nothing else, the political odium 
produced by an armed conflict between Turkey and a major NATO ally would 
have been too great. 
The overall history of the ill-fated Geneva negotiations has been discussed in 
several publications, academic and other (Asmussen, 2008:181-215 and 
Polyviou, 2010). What should be noted here is that the UK and Callaghan in 
particular invested considerable effort to convene both its stages; Callaghan 
actually took it upon himself to achieve some measure of agreement, even 
strive for success. An exchange between Callaghan and Hartman, the US envoy 
is quite indicative of the former’s views and the latter’s opinions on 8 August, 
just as the negotiations were starting. They also point to the difference in 
attitude that was evident between the UK and the US:  
Mr. Callaghan said that he would not put his hand to a bad agreement.  
Mr. Hartman said that it was not necessary for the Secretary of State to put his 
hand to anything except encouraging the parties to find more common ground. 
When Mr. Callaghan suggested that this would mean there would have to be 
some Turkish withdrawal, Mr. Hartman said that this was the only lever the 
Turks had56. 
As regards James Callaghan, the episode begs at least two important questions. 
The first question is why was Callaghan “rattling the sabre” (as Kissinger later 
accused him) particularly if he did not intend to use military force? This was an 
action that made him (at least appear) partial to the Greek side, in a negotiation 
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 See eg TNA, FCO 9/1922,  “Record of a conversation between Mr. Callaghan and Mr. A. Hartman at 
the FCO on 8 August 1974 at 10.30 a.m”, where Hartman clearly tells Callaghan that “that the 
important thing was to keep the process going. As long as there was talking, there was hope. The UK 
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  28 
he was chairing. We shall return to this question later. The second question is 
what stopped Callaghan from using force.  
 
8. Killing Callaghan’s military option  
Looking at the question of using the British military in Cyprus first, the answer 
is relatively clear. It was difficult for Britain to ‘go it alone’ in Cyprus. If force 
was used, this would have to be either with the support of the US, or at least 
with its tacit agreement. There was no chance of using force against the wishes 
of the superpower: the shadow of Suez was still weighing heavily on Britain 
(Polyviou, 2010:165). And throughout the crisis the US was either unwilling to 
intervene or openly against an active involvement. Indeed Kissinger, the single 
most powerful force in US foreign policy at the time, seems to have been 
consistently, even avidly, against any form of military involvement whatsoever 
throughout the Cyprus crisis. To give one example, on 21 July, 08:10 GMT, the 
US Consul in Nicosia requested permission from the FCO to land a company of 
US Marines in Dhekelia SBA, to help with the evacuation of US citizens within 
the confines of the Sovereign Base Area; by 09:30, Kissinger had heard of this 
and “was angry about it. He had ordered that the request be withdrawn…”57. 
Subsequently, the US consistently followed the policy of strictly diplomatic 
involvement, with not a shadow of military muscle behind it throughout the 
crisis.  
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 TNA, FCO 9/1896, “Cyprus, Time-table of events 21 July”; Cf. Note, “US Request to land Marines 
at Dhekelia”, putting the conversation with the Americans at 10:30: “Dr Kissinger was ignorant of it 
[the request], and was alleged to have been furious when told.” 
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Kissinger’s ‘strictly diplomacy’ policy was further reinforced by a clear refusal 
to sanction or accept military moves by Britain, the UN or any other quarter 
except Turkey (complemented by active efforts to prevent Greece from going 
to war). As far as the UN is concerned, it is fair to say that this policy had the 
obvious advantage of stopping Soviet forces from arriving in Cyprus (even as 
part of UNFICYP). However, since it also extended to Greece, which was also 
discouraged or stopped from either declaring war or sending significant 
reinforcements to Cyprus; indeed it could be argued that the point in time when 
the US (and Henry Kissinger himself) exerted the strongest force on Turkey, 
was the 22 July armistice. A discussion in Washington on 21 July is quite 
indicative of the approach that seemed to aim for a new “balance of forces” in 
Cyprus, a balance that could be achieved only if Turkish presence was 
reinforced further at the expense of the Greek side: 
Secretary Kissinger: […] Our major effort now is to achieve a ceasefire; the 
talks can get started any time. If the Turks hold—what is the state of play on 
the island now? 
Mr. Colby: Well, it’s unclear, but they do have a foothold. 
Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me they haven’t done as well militarily as 
they have politically. 
Mr. Colby: You’re right, they haven’t done very well militarily. 
[…] 
Secretary Kissinger: Then the Greeks are fighting better than we thought they 
would. 
[…]  
Secretary Kissinger: I’m trying to understand what the balance of forces 
[underline added] would be when negotiations start so that we can chart a 
course. 
Mr. Colby: If there is a ceasefire, it would seem to me that the Turkish effort 
failed. They wanted to seize a substantial area—more than they have now—
and they have failed [underline added]58. 
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 WSAG, July 21, 1974, 9:33–11:23 a.m., in FRUS, p. 358. The meeting was chaired by H. Kissinger. 
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And a little further in the same discussion:  
Secretary Kissinger: […] Seems to me that Ecevit is not doing well militarily. 
They are doing lousy militarily.  […] What is going to be the balance of forces 
if we get a ceasefire? 
Mr. Colby: The National Guard is doing quite well, they have some  40,000 
troops.  
Secretary Schlesinger: I don’t think we can get an accurate picture of the 
balance of forces because the only thing we have is a ceasefire. They can 
bring in more troops under a ceasefire, reinforce here and there. That would 
change the whole picture. 
Secretary Kissinger: It is against our interests to have the Greeks in there. A 
strong Turkish presence would be highly desirable. What went wrong, 
anyway? [underline added] 
Mr. Colby: They have turned out to be tough59. 
The ceasefire actually stopped Greece from going to war, even if it could or 
wanted to; however, one has to take into account the fact that the final text of 
the US-sponsored armistice in Cyprus did not prohibit Turkey from landing 
further forces in Cyprus. As the US policy makers put it, 
Secretary Kissinger: As I look at it, the balance of forces picture is this. The 
Turks have not followed up their gains on the beachhead, and they are doing 
even less well in the communities. It seems to me that it is unlikely that the 
Turks will be able to overtake the Greek Cypriots. Even in time. 
Mr. Ingersoll: We can probably rely on the Turks to keep reinforcing60. 
The result appears clear: as early as 22 July 1974, the US was helping shape a 
new balance of forces, a balance that had a strong military and territorial 
component. However, this policy could work only if all other parties, other than 
Turkey, agreed (or were made to agree) not to use force. Hence the scuttling of 
British intentions for military action, either alone or in collaboration with the 
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 WSAG, July 21, 1974, 9:33–11:23 a.m., in FRUS, p. 360.  
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 WSAG, July 22, 1974, 10:42–11:25 a.m., in FRUS, pp. 378-79:  
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UN was necessary. In effect, all this left the field clear for the Turkish armed 
forces to proceed with the imposition of the territorial ‘rule of thirds’. 
As shown above, James Callaghan seems to have been relatively slow on the 
uptake of this aspect of US policy. It was from Geneva as late as 12 August, 
that he telegraphed to Harold Wilson: 
“[..] d. The United States could not consider military action against the Turks; 
it was out of the question at a time when a new US Administration was taking 
office. 
e. Kissinger does not consider threats of military action are helpful in present 
circumstances. Such gestures tend to create problems for Ecevit with the 
extremists in Turkey. 
It has been made clear to Hartman that I am not contemplating any further 
military action at the moment and that all new action on reinforcements has 
been suspended since yesterday”61. 
In the author’s view, what is remarkable is not that Callaghan (and Britain) fell 
in line with the US policy of non-intervention; it is the fact that in July and 
August 1974 Callaghan kept the option alive (and therefore diverged from US 
policy) for almost three weeks. 
9. Britain in Cyprus: a defeat on home ground and the final eclipse  
The existence of the Australian telegram appears to indicate a slightly different 
interpretation of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The evidence presented in this paper 
seems to point towards an alternative approach, at least as regards Britain. Even 
though it may have entered the crisis in a perfidia albio ‘mode’, ready to 
secretly accept territorial concessions in Cyprus that would normally be 
unacceptable in open diplomacy, Britain subsequently radically altered its 
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course, trying to assume a much more central and active role. Thus it could be 
argued that in Geneva Britain, did try to fulfil at least part of its Guarantor 
Power obligations, working on the assumption that the talks were aimed at 
trying to find a negotiated solution. However, that assumption appeared 
increasingly shaky and a solution proved way beyond Britain’s capability. 
Combined with other data (some of it presented above), the evidence also puts 
in doubt the established view in part of the relevant literature, that the Turkish 
invasion was a clear victory, at least in its first phase. If what the FCO told the 
Australians stands, the invasion was not the crushing success which is often 
portrayed to have been, since it clearly failed to attain its goals. In fact, at the 
time, the British, the Americans (and based on US information, the 
Australians62 and the Canadians63) considered it a near-failure. In fact, the 
“crushing success” for the Turks came later, during the second phase of the 
invasion; this is why the British and the US attitude in mid-August becomes 
important.  
To get back to the first stage of the invasion, in a related (counterfactual) 
argument, one wonders whether Britain would have adopted the same position, 
if the military outlook was not favourable for Turkey. If the military experts’ 
views had indeed such a deciding influence on British policy, the real success 
of Turkey in the first phase of the invasion was not military; it was in the realm 
of perceptions of its expected success. During the early stages of the invasion, 
perceptions of success gained time for Turkey, during which its military action 
was acceptable (at least for Britain) if only because it was expected to succeed. 
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 See footnote 38, above. 
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 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, file 9409, part 2 (16 Jul.-31 Dec. 1974), Ankara tel. 
1003, 22 Jul 1974, “Cyprus: Cease-fire”. 
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The question of the path the Turkish war aims followed from the limited 
version presented to Britain on 17 July, to one third of territory in the 
Australian telegram, remains unanswered. We may, however, speculate that the 
British side reached its conclusion not because Turkey made a clear statement 
of aims, but by a) the fact that it neither outlined nor excluded specific 
territorial demands in Cyprus and b) the British military experts’ views. Again, 
perceptions seem to be an important factor. In any event, the Turkish aim 
appears to have been a third of the territory of Cyprus from the very beginning, 
and both the British and the US Government had apparently realised this. The 
difference lay in whether they accepted it (as the US did) or rejected it (as was 
Callaghan’s line)64. However, why would either the UK or the US worry if 
Turkey in July 1974 had failed to achieve its expected aims? If Callaghan and 
the FCO were ready to acquiesce to Turkey occupying a third of Cyprus up to 
22 July, why did they ‘change their mind’ just shortly afterwards? Why did 
Callaghan in particular go to such lengths over Cyprus during virtually the 
whole of the period from 22 July to 14 August 1974? 
 
10. Explanations I: Callaghan and the change in policy  
It could be argued that, by 22 July 1974 Callaghan was actively assuming the 
role of the representative of the guarantor power and going into ‘fair play 
mode’: once the expected Turkish success did not materialise, Britain opted for 
negotiations and chose to stick by them, through thick and thin in order to 
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July 1974 included the information that the Turkish invasion was planned as a 5-day operation, stopped 
half-way; it also predicted a further offensive and advance. 
  34 
avoid further military confrontation; what is important to note here is the 
tenacity by which James Callaghan in particular persevered, regardless of the 
(real or perceived) duplicity of friend and fellow conversant alike: the Turks 
would have to accept the limits their military venture produced and pursue their 
aims through negotiations. 
There are also additional possible explanations. According to one school of 
thought, Callaghan’s ‘pro-Greek’ position was due to his concern to protect the 
fragile democratic regime in Greece and prevent war between Greece and 
Turkey (Asmussen, 2008:295). However, on its own, this fails to explain why 
Callaghan went to such lengths over Cyprus during virtually the whole of the 
period from 22 July to 14 August 1974. In particular it fails to explain his 
return time and again to the possibility of use of military forces to control the 
reinforcement of the Turkish bridgehead and later, before the second phase of 
the invasion, to contain the expected Turkish advance.  
One other explanation could lie in Callaghan’s personal involvement. As 
Hartman reported on 9 August, failure or bowing to Turkish tactics could not 
meet his “minimal political needs at home where he, as Chairman of a Labor 
Party approaching elections, simply cannot afford to be seen as completely 
selling out the new Greek Govt.”65 Foreign Secretary pride and the cost of 
failure are always important factors, particularly for aspiring front-bench 
politicians, such as Callaghan was at the time. In turn, these may have led him 
to try to play his hand strongly during the Cyprus crisis, aiming for a foreign 
policy victory.  
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 See FRUS pp. 416-7, Telegram from the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, for the 
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11. Explanations II: the US and territory for Turkey in Cyprus  
When, in July 1974, Britain was apparently abandoning the expectation that the 
Turkish invasion would lead to the partition of Cyprus under ‘the rule of 
thirds’, the US was adopting it. The problem was that the US (read: Kissinger, 
since to a large extent by this point this was the Secretary’ own game) failed to 
make this clear to Callaghan, leaving the latter vulnerable, the proverbial 
‘dummy in the middle’66 (a phrase that James Callaghan himself used). 
However, as regards Cyprus, the ‘dummy’ was neither ignorant nor entirely 
powerless. Indeed it was endowed with considerable local knowledge, a degree 
of freedom of action given by the existence of its Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) 
on the island and its (admittedly, restricted) military capability; it also seemed 
to have at least some ethical considerations, if not a wide diplomatic experience 
(Kissinger, 2000:209 and Polyviou, 2010:164-165).  
Both the Australian telegram (for the British) and evidence of the US 
documents seems to imply that both countries were aware that Turkey 
ultimately aimed for a third of the territory of Cyprus. In the case of the US, 
knowledge of the ‘final’ line of the Turkish advance apparently even extended 
(at some stage) to information marked on a map67. On the other hand, Britain 
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was apparently left to guess, on the basis of the Günes plan map68. However, 
awareness cannot be translated to either collusion or cooperation: Britain may 
have suspected (even expected) the territorial outcome, but does not seem to 
have been fully convinced of a two-stage planning for the Turkish operation, at 
least not in the beginning (Asmussen, 2008:294 and Polyviou, 2010:170-
171)69. Did the Turkish army put into effect contingency plans, after the 
‘failure’ (real or perceived) of the first stage of the invasion? Or did the plan 
provide for a two stage campaign from the start? At this stage no clear answer 
is available. 
In this context, another related question is why was Henry Kissinger so 
strongly against a military option (in any form) to avert the invasion during the 
period under consideration. In the first volume of his memoirs, after conceding 
that “only the threat of American military action could have prevented a 
Turkish landing on the island”, he claims that Nixon’s resignation and the 
accession of Gerald Ford to the US presidency prevented the US from making 
“credible threats or credible promises”; he reinforces this point by stating that 
unanimous advice of the congressional leaders was against US involvement, 
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though his view was that the US “could not avoid diplomatic engagement in a 
NATO crisis” (Kissinger, 2000) 70. Why then was he against military action by 
the British? Early on in the crisis, he had told the British Ambassador in 
Washington that, “he would like to procrastinate until he could see clearly how 
the forces were balanced”71. However, what remains, unclear is the point at 
which the optimal balance of forces would be reached. In a conversation with 
President Ford, on 10 August, after declaring the British forces in Cyprus 
inadequate (in fact he informs Ford there are only 1000 British troops in 
Cyprus, thus giving a figure under a quarter of the correct number, “and a few 
Phantoms”) he claims that the British plan to use force “[…] is purely a 
political thing. They [the British] could not pull it off. They want to get a crisis 
started and we would then have to settle it and they would claim credit.”72  
Is this contradictory? Probably not. It may well be that Henry Kissinger’s 
policy evolved through the crisis. One could argue (as Asmussen does) that 
“Kissinger’s crisis diplomacy in Cyprus was a disaster to anybody save 
himself” (Asmussen, 2008:291), a line Miller also espouses when he states that 
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“incompetence, not malevolence was the persistent hallmark of his 
[Kissinger’s] eastern Mediterranean policy”73.  
However, one could also consider an alternative approach: the coup against 
Makarios and –more importantly- the Turkish invasion that followed, presented 
Kissinger (and initially, the British) with an opportunity to alter the ‘balance of 
forces’ in Cyprus –and perhaps create a new balance. Kissinger’s agonising 
about how the new balance of forces74 is shaping up in Cyprus -and how it 
could be influenced through negotiations- is an indication of such an approach. 
However, the basic precondition of a new balance (causing a world to be not 
‘restored’ but ‘reshaped’, to paraphrase the title of Kissinger’s doctoral 
dissertation), were the new facts on the ground, i.e. a successful Turkish 
invasion that did not, at the same time, lead to a strengthened mainland Greek 
presence on Cyprus. This would explain Kissinger’s approach as regards the 
Turkish military operations (at least once it was clear Greece could not 
reinforce Cyprus or go to war with Turkey); the intensive US efforts to prevent 
the Greek junta from declaring war; and it would also shed light on the US 
standing largely aloof from the negotiations in Geneva. In this context, it could 
even be argued that (besides the pressure the US brought to bear to achieve a 
ceasefire in July), the other occasion when Kissinger really exerted his 
influence was in Geneva Stage II (in August 1974), in order to make sure the 
Günes plan (in which 34% of Cyprus passed under Turkish control) was put 
forward by Turkey; and this again proposed a territorial division along the lines 
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of the ‘rule of thirds’75. Acceptance of Turkish territorial aims76 would also 
explain his refusal to sanction any initiative even remotely verging on the 
military by any external actor (the US, Britain, the UN and of course the 
USSR) – a fact that allowed Turkey, to attain its territorial goals, either by 
negotiations or, as happened, by military force. 
It is true that (as he claims in his memoirs) military action of any sort would 
antagonise Turkey; it is also true that absence of such moves gave Turkey a 
free hand in Cyprus. Thus, faced with no military reaction from West or East, 
the ‘rule of thirds’ was forcibly applied by the Turkish Army, three weeks after 
the date ‘predicted’ in the Australian telegram and after the US had essentially 
accepted the territorial division of Cyprus. Thus, notwithstanding the later 
(September 1974) claim of the US ambassador to Greece that “… the US did 
not tilt toward the Turks –the balance of forces had tilted in favor of the 
Turks”77, US actions did help shape the balance in Cyprus; neither the military 
nor the territorial balance, have been essentially altered since then. 
Was there an international conspiracy in Cyprus in 1974? The answer lies in 
the relationship between morality, behavioural norms and realism as a school 
of international relations. It is true that sometimes we all expect statespersons 
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(statesmen in this case) to behave in a responsible and moral way; however, 
according to at least one school of international relations, the main aim of 
foreign affairs is the successful pursuit of security and the national interests. 
This is what Kissinger expressed when he told President Ford on 13 August 
that “There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of 
Cyprus”78. The new ‘balance of forces’ created (or at least, shaped to an extent) 
by Kissinger’s actions in Cyprus has been the cause of war with all its 
accompanying stories of pain, dislocation, missing persons and death for both 
sides in Cyprus. Furthermore, in the self-seeking sphere, it has also created a 
source of leverage for the USA that has yet to dry up. Immoral as this thought 
may be considered, this leverage is a resource for any practitioner of 
international affairs (Fouskas, 2005:45-63 and Lindley, 2007:224-241). 
The last point has to be the effect the Cyprus crisis and the developments 
described above have had on the standing of Britain in Cyprus. It could be 
argued that Callaghan’s efforts were the last instance when Britain actively 
took the lead in the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. This is something that 
Callaghan himself seems to have realised. Shortly after the events, in a meeting 
to debate British policy, Callaghan remarked succinctly both on the new British 
position and on its future standing: 
1. Mr. Callaghan said that he saw no particular interest in Britain remaining in 
the forefront of the search for a settlement in Cyprus. He accepted that we had 
certain obligations but we should move out of the centre of the stage as soon 
as we could do so honourably. Dr. Kissinger thought Mr. Callaghan should 
continue to take the lead in the next round of talks. However, he did not like 
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responsibility without power and for his own part he would not mind moving 
out from a central position before the next round 79 
It may well be that Britain, at the touchline was prepared to accept ‘pragmatic’ 
solutions as regards territory in Cyprus; however, it subsequently tried to act 
responsibly, even morally. Since the effect of whatever power it had was 
negated by external forces, responsibility was a hollow shell. The year 1974 
saw the eclipse of Britain from the main Cypriot stage and its official 
replacement by the US, in a quiet change of guard in Cyprus. Despite the 
continued existence of the British Sovereign Bases, the situation remains 
largely unchanged to this day.  
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Appendix 
The Australian Telegram – page 1 
 
Transcript of the handwritten note: “This is Glafkos Klerides [sic] who, I gathered when in Athens is a 
very good type – not a thing like Sampson. Query, however, whether Klerides would wish to supplant 
Makarios. He might agree to be “Acting President” [underline and quotes in the original]  for a period 
of time till the dust settled. Kleridis is respected in Athens and Ankara. He would need pretty cast-iron 
assurances of local support, even as Acting Head. [Sgd] H. Gilchrist. 
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The Australian Telegram – page 2 
  44 
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